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L

INTRODUCTION

This case is simply and solely about what due process procedures are due to an
owner/lessor of an Idaho state liquor license so that it may protect its interest from expiring by
operation of law. Contrary to the characterizations of this appeal presented by Respondent Idaho
Alcohol Beverage Control ("'ABC'" or the .. Agency''), appellant BY Beverage Company. LLC
("'BY Beverage") does not claim that Idaho Code Section 23-908 is unconstitutional, nor does it
ask that the ABC be required to take actions that are expressly forbidden by Idaho Code Section
23-908.
Rather. BY Beverage simply submits to this Court that because the Idaho legislature has
created a marketplace for the transfer of an interest in a liquor license by lease, and because the
ABC requires the lessor/owner to pay a substantial fee for its interest in a liquor license and
undergo the same background checks required of the licensee/lessee, the ABC is also required to
put into place minimum due process procedures that allow an owner/lessor to protect its property
right from expiring by operation of !avv.
Because it is undisputed that minimum due process protections are not available to
owner/lessors. their property interests are subject to unconstitutional taking through expiration by
operation of law. BY Beverage respectfully requests that this Court find that the failure to enact
constitutionally adequate due process protections is an administrative act subject to judicial
review and, further, to find that the lack of procedures subjected BY Beverage to an
unconstitutional taking vvithout due process of law.
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II.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE AGENCY'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION MISSTATES A NUMBER OF FACTS AND ARGUMENTS
MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.

In its Respondent's Brief, the Agency takes too much liberty with a number of facts that
appear in the record and misconstrues and/or mischaracterizes a number of arguments presented
by BV Beverage. By these factual misrepresentations and mischaracterization of the arguments
presented. the Agency has submitted a brief that does not fairly meet the substance of the
opening Appellate Brief filed by BV Beverage. Accordingly, BV Beverage respectfully requests
this Court's indulgence to address these matters one by one so that any confusion arising from
them may be resolved.
l.

"Unbeknownst to ABC, on September 29, 2010, BV Received by fax from
Iggy's a Release of Interest and Right of Renewal document, releasing Iggy's
interest in the licensee back to BV." Resp. Br. at 1.

The document BV Beverage received from Iggy's was not a "Release of Interest and
Right of Renewal." Rather. it was an ·'Affidavit-Release of Interest.'' R. p. 57. The Agency
represents on its website that the ''Affidavit-Release of Interest" is the form to be used when
the original license is not available. Available at: http://www.isp.idaho.gov/abc/. Cf R. p. 117
(letter from Cheryl Meade stating "These licenses themselves have an expiration date stamped
in big letters on the front of them."). The .. Affidavit-Release of Interest" does not state whether
license is current, nor does it purport to transfer the right to renew a license. See, e.g R. p. 304.
And, indeed. under the ABC's procedure. '"it is incumbent upon a licensee to continue its
renewal until the time of transfer.., R. p. 117.
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2.

"In essence, BV sought and continues to seek to be placed in the same shoes
as a licensee." Resp. Br. at 2.

BY Beverage does not. and never has. asked that it be placed in the same shoes as a
licensee. BY Beverage asse11s that. by creating a marketplace for the transfer of a liquor license
by lease. the Idaho legislature created divisible prope11y rights in an Idaho state liquor license
and that as the owner/lessor it should be allmved notice and opportunity to protect its interest in
such liquor license in its own right. See. e.g. R. p. l 83 ("[T]he Agency cannot treat lessors as
complete strangers to the license and require the lessor to complete a transfer from the lessee
back to the lessor as a precondition

to

allmving the lessor the right to renew. Without proper

notice and opportunity to renew given to the lessor in its capacity as lessor, adverse actions taken
against the lessee (even if they occur by operation of law) cannot impact the lessor's property
rights."). See. also. R. p. i 69-178.
Agreeing with BV Beverage·s arguments. the District Court concluded that lessors have a
protectable property right in their owner/lessor's interest in a liquor license. R. p. 342. ("Here.
just as the examples cited to in Roth. the rights appurtenant to the possession of a liquor license
are statutorily created. Among the rights created by the statute is the right to transfer a liquor
license by lease. See I.C. § 23-908. Furthermore. liquor license owners have the right to renew
their licenses. Id.

The Idaho Code, therefore. creates in the owner of the liquor license an

economic benefit that may not be revoked arbitrarily. Given the statutory scheme governing
liquor licenses, the Court finds that the owner of a liquor license has a property interest in the
license. and is therefore entitled to notice and the oppo11unity to be heard.").

Because

owner/lessors are entitled to due process protections in their own right. BV Beverage is not
asking to "step into the shoes'' of a licensee. Instead it is asking to be afforded minimum due
process protections in its own right.
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3.

"The only person lawfully allowed to exercise the privilege of holding an
alcohol beverage license is the licensee. The privilege to renew a license is
also held exclusively by the licensee according to law." Resp. Br. at 2 (citing
to Idaho Code§§ 23-908(1), 23-907 and 23-1010, and R. p. 246).

These two statements encompass the very questions to be resolved on this appeal.
Placing them in the "factual and procedural" background section of the brief with citations to
statutory authority as though they are well settled law misrepresents the state of the law in Idaho
and misconstrues the issues to be decided on appeal.
4.

"ABC is not authorized by law to notify third-party lessors of renewal
dates." Resp. Br. at 4 (citing IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.11.03).

This is the ABC s interpretation of the statute, not a statement of existing law. Moreover.
the authority cited is an administrative regulation promulgated by the ABC. The administrative
regulation cited neither permits nor prohibits the ABC taking any affirmative steps regarding
providing notice of renewal dates.
5.

"The law does not provide for an exception of additional time for renewal in
instances where transfers are occurring. Resp. Br. at 4 (citing IDAPA Rule
11.05.01.12.

While a technically correct statement of the law, this statement mischaracterizes the issue
on appeal as BV Beverage has not asked that additional renewal time be given when transfers are
occurrmg.

Rather, BV Beverage argues that as an owner/lessor, it should have had the

opportunity to renew without first undergoing a cumbersome transfer process. App. Br. at 3.
For example of cumbersome transfer process required to renew license, see, e.g., R. p. 299-309;
compare R. p. 45-46 (regarding the BY/Iggy's Transfer) with R. p. 54-56 (regarding the

attempted BV /Screamin' Hot transfer).
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6.

"(Idaho Code § 23-908! does not provide ABC with the authority to approve
any lease agreements between a lessor and lessee. R. p. 247. Nor does ABC
engage in such approval. Id." Resp. Br. at 5.

The undisputed record evidence shows that the ABC does undertake review of a lease
agreement between a lessor and lessee and extracts a substantial fee regarding an owner·s
interest in a liquor license. When a liquor license is transferred pursuant to a lease, the ABC
mandates that both the lessor/owner and the lessee/licensee submit full and complete transfer
applications. See R. p. 301-303 (Liquor License Application for Transfer by Sale from Donna
Ritz to BV Beverage Company, LLC) and R. p. 45-46 (Liquor License Application for Transfer
by Lease from BV Beverage Company.

to Iggy's Idaho Falls, Inc.). The required forms

mandate that the liquor license lease agreement be submitted with the application. R. p. 46
(approximately half-way down the page provides ''Liquor License:
of the valid lease)

7.

Leased (Attached a copy

Owned- Purchase Price - -.")

"On .January 7, 2011, BV attempted to renew and transfer (the expired
license) back to itself from Iggy's and then to a national restaurant chain
called Screamin' Hot Concepts, LLC. R. p. 295, and R. pp. 53-57." Resp.
Br. at 6.

BV Beverage did not attempt to renew the license at the time it attempted to transfer from
Iggy's back to itself and then to Screamin' Hot Concepts. This is because BV Beverage had no
actual knowledge that Iggy's had not renewed the license until the transfer application was
rejected. R. p. 59. At that time, BV Beverage questioned the ABC regarding why it did not
receive notice that the license had not been renewed and/or opportunity to renew the same. R. p.
91-92. The ABC took the position that because BV Beverage had no interest in the license. it
was not entitled to renew the license. R. p. 121 c·the right to renew is included among the
privileges appurtenant to a liquor license and is a privilege which is to be exercised exclusively
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by the named licensee. l 03 Idaho 364 ( 1982). In the immediate case, the named licensee was
Iggy's. Therefore, ABC's attempt to notify the licensee of the renewal requirement was properly
made.").

8.

"BV's argument that ABC's licensing of alcoholic beverages is merely
ministerial misses the mark." Resp. Br. at 14 (citing App. Br. at 13, section
2(b).

BY Beverage has never argued that licensing of alcoholic beverages is merely
ministerial. To the contrary. BY Beverage has consistently noted that licensing is a police power
but renewals, which occur as a matter of course, are not.

R. at p. 324 ('"When conducting

background checks and other investigations associated with the processing of a transfer
application the Agency is appropriately exercising its police power. However, when processing
a renewal application, the Agency is simply completing a ministerial act or duty.''); see also App.
Br. at 13 (""Because renewal of a liquor license is a ministerial duty .... ''); and R. p. I 78 ("The
State does not exercise its police powers with respect to the renewal of a liquor license.")
(emphasis added).
9.

"[Idaho Code §§ 23-905 and 9071 provide[), among other things and in
relevant part, that an applicant wishing to become a licensee must submit to
an investigation. This investigation includes a background check and
fingerprinting. The third-partv lessor is not subject to these same statutorv
requirements." Resp. Br. at 15 (emphasis added).

The statement that a third-party lessor is not subject to a background check and
fingerprinting is false and directly contradicted by the record. R. p. 299 (Cover letter from BY
Beverage to the ABC regarding owner/lessor interest in the license:

"The $102.00 check is

remitted as payment of fees associated \vith the processing of fingerprints for Cortney Liddiard,
Allen Ba!L and Connie Ball'') and R. p. 301 (Reply letter from ABC to BY Beverage: "'Check
#2009 in the amount of $102.00 was received for the fingerprints for Cortney Liddiard, Allen
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Ball. and Connie Ball. Allen Ball was already on file for another license, so the $34.00 for his
fingerprints was applied to the renewal fees .... ").

Indeed, BV Beverage has consistently

maintained that the investigation of owner/lessor applicants renders the rationale supporting

Uptick unpersuasive. R. p. 166-169. However, the ABC refuses to meet the substance of this
legal argument. as it continues to incorrectly represent that it does not conduct background
checks and investigations on lessor/owners.

Resp. Br. at 15 (''The third party lessor is not

subject to these same statutory requirements"). If the ABC does not conduct background checks
of lessor/owners, then Jamie Adams' letter dated November L 2007. which represented that the
ABC retained money from BV Beverage for the express purpose of processing fingerprint cards
of Cortney Liddiard and Connie BalL constitutes a fraud. R. p. 301.

10.

"Had BV filed this [Affidavit-Release of License] with ABC prior to this
statutory deadline, ABC would have recognized BV as the licensee and
renewal could have been made timely." Resp. Br. at 22 (citing R. p. 57).

This statement is not supported by any record evidence and ignores BV Beverage's
position that it should have been allowed to renew without first having to re-transfer the license.
As discussed at paragraph l, above, the form "Affidavit-Release of License" is a different fonn
and serves a function different than that of a ''Release of Liquor License and Transfer of Right of
Renewal.''

The former is used when the original license is not available and contains no

information or representations regarding renewal rights.

Accordingly, there is no record

evidence regarding how BV Beverage could have renewed its owner/lessor's interest in the
liquor license without first submitting a full application to "re-transfer" the license back to itself
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE OWNER OF A LIQUOR
LICENSE TRANSFERRED BY LEASE HAS A PROTECTABLE PROPERTY RIGHT IN RENEWING
SUCH LIQliOR LICENSE.

In its continued claims that owner/lessors have no property rights in the liquor licenses
for which they paid good and valuable consideration (both to the seller and to the state), the ABC
ask this Court to reverse the District Court's decision that [Jptick is not controlling under the
facts of this case. However. because the District Court correctly recognized critical factors
distinguishing this case from Uptick and, thereafter, undertook an appropriate analysis of
property rights associated with a liquor license pursuant to current constitutional jurisprudence,
the District Court was correct in that determination and it should be affirmed.

1.

The facts of this case are materially distinguishable from Uptick and it is,
therefore, not controlling in this matter.

The Agency's reliance on Uptick makes sense only if Uptick is unmoored from its factual
and historical context. Specifically, that portion of Uptick which designates the right to renew as
a privilege that must be restricted to the named licensee simply does not make sense in light of
legislative and administrative changes that have occurred with respect to the statute:
The right to renew is included among the privileges appurtenant
to a liquor license and is a privilege which is to be exercised
exclusively by the named licensee. To hold otherwise would
enable persons who have not subjected themselves to the
scrutiny and approval of the director of the Department of
Law Enforcement to acquire an interest in a license and
circumvent the policv of the act that only qualified persons
own licenses and exercise rights thereunder.

Uptick at 369, 647 P.2d at 1241 (emphasis added). While this rationale may have held in the
factual and historical context within which Uptick was decided, at the time Uptick was working
its way through the judicial system, the Idaho State Legislature amended Idaho's liquor by the
drink act and added Section 23-908( 6 ), which specifically allowed for transfers of liquor license

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 8

by lease. In putting this amendment into place, the Agency requires lessor/owners to submit to
the exact same background checks to which the licensee is subject. Accordingly, when one
reviews closely the rationale behind this language it is clear (as the District Court recognized, R.
p. 342-43) that Uptick does not control in this case because now the ABC does subject
owner/lessors to its scrutiny, and it extracts a fee from them for doing so. See section A. 6.
above and R. p. 45-46. BV Beverage holds its owner/lessor's interest in the state liquor license
pursuant to this state sanctioned process and has undergone the Agency's review and approval.
Accordingly, there is no legitimate basis to apply the Uptick rationale to disavow BV Beverage's
prope11y rights.

2.

The Supreme Court of the United States' rejected the wooden distinction
between privileges and property rights, thereby recognizing that property
rights can attach to liquor licenses.

Not only has the factual rational underlying the Uptick decision been undone by
legislative amendment and subsequent administrative enforcement of such amendments, changes
in constitutional jurisprudence also counsel against holding onto the rigid "liquor licenses as
privileges" conclusion reached by the Uptick court. For many years, courts across the country
held that the use of a state liquor license was a ..privilege'' to which no property rights could
attach. S'ee. e.g, Uptick Corp. v. Ahlin. 103 Idaho 364, 369-70. 647 P.2d 1236, 1241-42 (1982)
(citing authority from Arizona, Delaware. Mississippi, Montana, and Wyoming). However, by
the time C/Jtick was decided, the Supreme Court of the United States had '"fully and finally
rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and ·privileges' that once seemed to govern the
applicability of procedural due process rights.'' Bd. of"Regents o/State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564. 571 (1972). Accordingly. rather than relying on the wooden distinction between ''rights"
and .. privileges" upon which the ABC insists. constitutional jurisprudence requires that courts
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undertake a more studied analysis of the relationship at issue between the state and the party
alleging a property right in a liquor licenses.
Relying on Roth in another context, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that property rights
and their dimensions are ··are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation.
Dist., 149 Idaho 187. 198, 233 P.3d 118. 129 (2010) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). Moreover,

the Supreme Court of the United States has declared that Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 ( 1972), provide the appropriate framework to determine whether property rights can
arise from a state liquor license. Ciry of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 515 (1973). Since this
decision. courts in several of our sister states have begun to re-evaluate the rights/privilege
distinction as it applies to a liquor license. See. e.g. l'v/anos v. City olGreen Bay, 372 F. Supp.
40. 48-49 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (recognizing that the holder of a liquor license had a protectable
property interest in the right to renew a liquor license).
For instance, relying on the guidance of Bruno and the framework set forth in Perry and
Roth. the Michigan Supreme Court, reversed its longstanding position that a liquor license was a

·•privilege" granted by the state that could not carry any property rights. See, generally, Bundo v.
City of' Walled Lake, 395 Mich. 679, 238 N.W.2d 154 (1976).

Specifically, the Michigan

Supreme Court considered the right of renewal (the property rights at issue in this appeal) and
asked "whether the renewal of an existing liquor license ... involves a private "interest' which is
either ·liberty' or 'property' within the meaning of the due process clause of the United States
and Michigan Constitutions." Id at 688, 238 N.W.2d at 158. Rejecting its prior holdings that a
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liquor license was a "privilege" to which no property rights could attach, the Michigan Supreme
Court made the following comments:
[D]efendant in this case has misplaced its reliance on those
Michigan cases which have held that a liquor license is not a
·property righf because it is a 'privilege granted by the state'.
Whatever viability the ·rights/privilege' doctrine had in Michigan
jurisprudence in the past- under the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court the mere fact that an interest exists by the grace of
the government no longer precludes that interest from being treated
as a "property' right. Those Michigan cases which have relied
upon this doctrine in finding no property interests in liquor licenses
no longer can be followed for this purpose.

Id., at 691-92, 238 N.W. 2d at 160.
The court then went on to consider that (i) license holders, having already been issued a
license, have a reasonable expectation that a liquor license would be renewed; (ii) license holders
invest substantial time and money in liquor licenses based on the reasonable expectation of
renewal; and (iii) license holders could not get a new license quickly and easily if the license
were lost. Id.. at 693-695, 238 N. W.2d at 160-61. Based on these factors, the court determined
that the holder of a liquor license had a property interest in the right to renew and held that the
right to renew was subject to constitutional due process safeguards. Id.

3.

Where the state creates a marketplace for the transfer, exchange, sale, or
lease of a license, the property rights associated with a liquor license may be
held by one other than the named licensee.

The critical fact distinguishing this case from Uptick is that transfer of a liquor license by
lease is now authorized by the state through a legislative amendment. Where the issue has been
squarely presented, our sister courts consistently recognize that a state created marketplace for
the transfer. exchange. sale, or lease of a license. gives rise to property rights to anyone holding
an interest in a license pursuant to the state sanctioned transaction, which property rights are
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entitled to constitutional protections. See, e.g., State v. Saugen, 283 Minn. 402, 405, 169 N. W.
2d 37, 40 (1969) (noting that while a liquor license may be a privilege granted by the
government the ability to assign or transfer the license is a property right entitled to due
compensation in eminent domain proceedings).
In Saugen, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the value of a liquor license as it
related to the ·'going concern value'' of a business for purposes of eminent domain. The state
argued that, because a liquor license was a privilege, no property rights could attach and,
therefore, no compensation \vas due. Id. at 405, 169 N.W.2d at 40. While observing that the
several states differed as to whether a liquor license is properly characterized as property or a
privilege, vis-l't-vis third parties, the court noted:
This difference of opinion as to the legal nature of a liquor license
is apparently due to the fact not always recognized by the courts,
that such license, while a mere privilege as far as the relation
between the government and the licensee is concerned,
nevertheless constitutes a definite economic asset of monetary
value for its owner.
Id., at 405-06, 169 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Annotation, 148 A.LR. 492.). A state sanctioned
marketplace for the transfer and exchange of a license gives rise to a constitutional duty to
provide adequate protections for the property right thereby created:
It is submitted that \vherever the legislature has made licenses

assignable or transferable, and the transfer can be effected with the
consent of the authorities to anyone qualifying under the statute,
the property element of the license is sufficiently recognized to
warrant its exposure to seizure by the creditors of the licensee.
Id., at 406. 169 N.W.2d at 40; see also Boonstra v. City of'Chicago, 214 Ill. App.3d 379, 386-87.
574 N.E.2d 689, 694 (1991).
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Accordingly, unless the state is acting within its '·police power" for purposes of
determining if an applicant is fit to exercise the privileges associated with the license, (i.e .. use
the license to operate a liquor by the drink establishment), the license must be treated as a
property interest for all other purposes: "While it is true that liquor businesses are appropriately
subject to more scrutiny and control than most businesses when the government is acting
pursuant to its police power, they have the same rights as anv other business when the
government is not actina. pursuant to such police power. ... " Saugen., at 409, 169 N.W.2d at 42.
(emphasis added).
The dual cases of Barr v. Pontiac City Comm ·n. 90 Mich. App. 446, 282 N.W.2d 348
(Mich. App. 1979) and Bunn v. /vfichigan Liquor Control Comm ·n, 125 Mich. App. 84, 335
N. W.2d 913 (Mich. App. 1983) specifically considered the property rights of persons other than
the named licensee who hold an interest in a liquor license. In Barr the license owner sold his
interest in land, a building, and the liquor license to Epps, but retained for himself a security
interest in the license. 90 Mich. App. at 448-49, 282 N. W.2d at 349-50. When Barr applied to
have the license transferred back to himself, the licensing authority disapproved the transfer and
refused to grant Barr a due process hearing regarding its decision. Id. at 449, 282 N.W.2d at 449.
The licensing authority maintained that Barr - holder of a "reversionary interest" in the license was not entitled to a ··due process hearing because he had no property right in the license
renewal" and '·at best [Barr] had a mere unilateral expectation as an applicant for a license." Id
at 45 L 282 N.W. 2d at 350.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with the licensing authority's
decision, finding that the holder of a reversionary interest in a license has a greater property right
then a new applicant: ''While [Barr's] interest in the license is not 'title· per se. it is a much
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stronger interest than that of a new applicant or proposed transferee." Id. at 453, 282 N.W.2d at
351; accord Fuchs v. State, 272 P.3d 1257, 1262 (2012) (holding that a place on the liquor
license priority list is not a protectable property right).

The court then held that Barr's

reversionary interest in the liquor license gave him a property interest in the renewal of the
license and he was entitled to minimum due process protections. Barr, at 453, 282 N.W.2d at
351. Similarly, BV Beverage's interest as an owner/lessor is greater than that of the priority
waiting list applicant in Fuchs and, like the holder of the reversionary interest in Barr, BV
Beverage is entitled to due process protections.
Relying on Barr· s recognition of property rights in one holding a security interest in a
liquor license. the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the state cannot take adverse actions
respecting the named licensee that would work to undermine the property rights of another
holding an interest in that liquor license without proper due process safeguards. Bunn, 125 Mich.
App. at 88, 335 N.W. 2d at 915.
In Bunn, Bunn sold his liquor license to Lawson and reserved the right to have the license
transferred back to him in the event of default. Id .. at 87, 335 N.W.2d at 914. Lawson defaulted
and Bunn attempted to foreclose on Lawson's property, including the liquor license, and to have
the license transferred back into his name. Id., at 87-88, 335 N.W.2d at 915. While the court
held that Bunn did not have a sufficient interest in the license to entitle him to due process notice
of the adverse actions against Lawson, 1 Id., at 92, 335 N.W.2d at 917, it went on to hold that the
adverse actions against Lawson could not impact Bunn' s interest in the liquor license:

1

The concurring opinion disagreed with the court's conclusion that Bunn did not have sufficient interest in the
liquor license to give him the right to notice of the adverse proceedings pending against Lawson, stating: "I would
hold that [Bunn] did have a property right in the license in question sufficiently great so as to entitle him to notice of
the hearing before the city council as well as the MLCC revocation proceeding involving Lawson's liquor license.
The giving of such notice would not present any undue burden, in that the MLCC is aware of the identity of persons
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However, once [Bunn) foreclosed upon the property, he held a
reasonable and legitimate claim of entitlement to the liquor
licenses. The trial court in the foreclosure action provided in its
judgment and order that plaintiff regain all of his liquor licenses
from Lawson. We are of the opinion that Lawson's loss of the
licenses should not affect plaintiffs legitimate claims to them.
Id The court specifically noted that the State· s approval of the contractual arrangement between
Bunn and Lawson gave Bunn the legitimate expectation of retransfrr of the license to him.
should any problems arise with Lawson:
[B]ecause [Bunn's] sale of the business. including the underlying
contractual arrangements, was approved by the MLCC, his
expectation of retransfer. should any problems arise, was
legitimate. As the Court noted in Perry v. Sindermann, supra, [a]
person's interest in a benefit is a property interest for due process
purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings
that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit that he may
invoke at a hearing.'' 408 U.S. 601.
Based on [Bunn' s] legitimate understanding that
security
arrangements were legitimate and recognized by the MLCC.
[Bunn] is entitled to rudimentary due process as provided by the
Court in Barr v. Pontiac City Comm, supra. 449.

Id. at 93. 335 N.W. 2d at 917. Likewise, in this case the Agency extracted a fee (in the amount
of $15,000.00) from BV Beverage and, with full knowledge of the contractual arrangement
between BV Beverage as the owner/lessor and Iggy's as the licensee/lessee of the liquor license
possessed, reviewed, and approved the transaction.

BV Beverage therefore has a legitimate

expectation of rudimentary due process rights.

having such interest in licensed establishments."
Quinnel I, J. concurring).
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Bunn, 125 Mich. App. at 95-96, 335 N.W.2d at 918 (E.A.

4.

The legitimate expectation of the right to renew and the existence of a
marketplace for the transfer of a liquor license by lease, give rise to a lessor's
protectable property interest in the right to renew.

The State has created a marketplace for liquor licenses and it has a concurrent
responsibility to extend due process protections to the property rights arising from such
marketplace.

Where the licensing authority creates a marketplace for licenses, the licenses

become more than
just [a] mere personal permit []granted by a governmental body to
a person to pursue some occupation or carry on some business
subject to regulation under the police po\ver. Black's Law
Dictionary 829 (5th ed. 1979). In a functional sense, the[] licenses
embrace[] the essence of property in that they [are] securely and
durably owned and marketable.
Boonstra v. City o/Chicago, 214 Ill. App.Jd 379. 386-87. 574 N.E.2d 689. 694 (1991). That is

to say the privilege of use of a license regulated pursuant to the state· s police powers may carry
hallmarks of ownership and marketability that are subject to due process protections. Idaho state
liquor licenses carry all of the characteristics of marketability and, because these characteristics
are products of the state's licensing scheme. the state has the responsibility to ensure adequate
procedural safeguards.
Idaho's Retail Sale of Liquor-by-the-Drink Act (the Act), J.C. §§ 23-901 et seq., and the
Rules Governing Alcohol Beverage Commission (the Rules), IDAPA I J.05.01 et seq .. create a
legitimate expectation of renewal, create a marketplace for the sale and exchange of liquor
licenses. and support BV Beverage· s claimed property interest in the liquor license.
In Idaho, the State has created a legitimate expectation of renewal of all issued and
outstanding liquor licenses because such licenses are renewed as a matter of course. LC. § 23908(1 ). Even if the Director has initiated revocation proceedings against the licensees, he must
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still renew the license during the course of those proceedings.

I.C. § 23-933( 4 ). Like renewals,

transfers are also approved as a matter of course, unless the transfer applicant does not qualify
under the provisions of the Act. Licenses may be transterred by sale, in bankruptcy, through
testate or intestate succession, and by lease. LC. § 23-908(5)-(6).

2

Because the state allows for

only a limited number of licenses. I.C. § 23-903. they are a valuable asset to every person who
holds an interest in one.

The State. by creating a legitimate expectation of renewal and

sanctioning transfers. has created a very active marketplace for liquor licenses. The rational of

Barr. Boonstra, Bruno, Bundo, Bunn, Perry, Roth and S'uugen can and should guide this Court's
reasoned review of that portion of Uptick upon which the Agency relies to support its position
and hold that in the face of (i) materially distinguishable facts and (ii) more developed
constitutional jurisprudence. the Agency can no longer rely on Uptick to deprive lessor/owners of
their property interest in liquor licenses.

5.

The Agency's refusal to allow a lessor to renew a liquor license does not bear
a substantial relation to the exercise of its police power and infringes on the
lessor's fundamental property rights.

As between the licensee and the State in the exercise of its police power. a liquor license
is a privilege. see, e.g. Alcohol Bev. Control v. Boyd, 148 Idaho 944. 947. 231 P.3d I 041. I 044
(2010). but even the Court in Uptick noted and recognized that a liquor license was a valuable.
marketable asset.

l 03 Idaho 364, 365 n.1. 64 7 P .2d 1236. 123 7 n.1 (1982). Accordingly, a

2

Idaho Code Section 23-908(6) was added by the legislature at the time Uptick Corp. was making its way through
the courts. The Legislature specifically noted that the State was missing out on a lot of .. revenue generation" because
license holders were leasing their liquor licenses and avoiding the I 0% fee for selling liquor licenses. The state
expressly acknowledged the value created by limiting the number of liquor licenses and creating an active leasing
marketplace. It then sanctioned transfers by lease and added the 50% fee for the stated purpose of increasing state
revenue. H.B. 98, Idaho Sess. Laws. Ch. 74. p. I 08 (198 l ); Statement of Purpose & Fiscal Impact, RS 629 l ( 198 l );
State Affairs Committee Minutes, Jan. 27, 1981. Feb. 17, 1981. and Mar. JO, l98l. Attached as Appendix A for the
Court's convenience.
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distinction must be recognized: when the state is not acting pursuant to its police power. the
holders of liquor licenses owners of state issued licenses have the same property rights as any
other property owner. State v. Saugen, 283 Minn. 402. 409, 169 N.W.2d 37. 42 (1969).
Where the state's purported exercise of its --police powers" do not have ''some direct, real
and substantial relation to the public object sought to be accomplished" then .. it is incumbent
upon the judicial department to examine the [regulation] and determine \vhether or not the
legislatures have overreached their prerogative and impinged the fundamental law." Rowe v.
City

ol Pocatello. 70

Idaho 343, 350. 218 P.2d 695, 699 (1950).

·'[I]f an individual has

important interests vvhich otherwise would be entitled to the protection of procedural due
process, he cannot be denied this constitutional safeguard because the business in which he is
engaged happens to involve alcoholic beverages." Bunda v. City (?f Walled Lake, 395 Mich. 679.

687. 238 N.W.2d 154, 157 (1976).
The State does not exercise its police powers with respect to the renewal of a liquor
license. Once a person has been approved to own a liquor license. the Agency is required to
approve the renewal application if it is timely and accompanied by the proper fee. I.C. § 23-908.
Even if revocation proceedings are underway. the Agency must still approve renewal
applications.

LC. § 23-933(4). Because BV Beverage has subjected itself to the Agency's

application, review and approval process. the evils to be guarded against in Uptick do not exist.
Contrary to the Agency's representations, lessor/owners do submit to the ABC's review
and approval process and BV Beverage did so with respect to the at-issue license. The Agency
declared that BV Beverage was fit to own a liquor license and approved issuance of the license
to BV Beverage and. contemporaneous with such approvaL approved the transfer of that license
by lease to a third party. R. p. 000023-46. Because the State has exercised its police power in
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determining that BV Beverage is fit to own an interest in an Idaho State liquor license, the State
can gain nothing more in the exercise of its police powers by denying BV Beverage the right to
renevv and otherwise protect the previously approved interest. Accordingly, the Agency's refusal
to recognize BV Beverage's property rights in the license and refusal to allow BV Beverage to
renew the license does not bear a '"direct real, and substantial relation to the public object sought
to be accomplished.'' It is therefore unreasonable and should not be condoned.

C.

THE DISTRICT COlRT IMPROPERLY FOliND THAT

BV BEVERAGE WAS REQUIRED TO

TRY TO WORK AROl:ND AN ll1'1CONSTITlTIONAL SYSTEM PRIOR TO ASSERTING THAT ITS

DVE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED.

1.

The established state system is unconstitutional because it does not give
owner/lessors an opportunity to renew.

The State has created a marketplace for state liquor licenses so it cannot deprive the
lessor of its property rights in its liquor license without the minimum protections and safeguards
required by the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution and United States Constitution:
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Under Idaho Code § 23-932, the Director of the Idaho
State Police has the statutory duty "to prescribe forms to be used in the administration of this
act." Idaho Code § 23-908( 1) provides that those seeking to renew a license must submit a
"proper application .. and submit a ··renewal application" and fee on a schedule set by the
Director. Pursuant to these two sections. the Director must promulgate forms to be used in the
renewal of liquor licenses.
In carrying out its statutory duty to make forms available for the renewal of a liquor
license. the Agency sends renewal notices and applications for renevval to the named licensee
only.

Because the Agency does not recognize any property rights in the lessor of a liquor

license. the Agency maintains that the lessor has no right to renew the license and does not
provide renewal applications to lessors of liquor licenses. Likewise, the Agency does not notify
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the owner of the liquor license if the lessee has failed to timely submit its renewal application. If
a lessor wishes to renew the liquor license it must go through the same transfer application
process as a person who holds no interest whatsoever in the license: it must submit a transfer
application (to recover the license back from the lessee) along with the lessee· s renewal
application and an Authorization to Transfer and Assignment of Privilege to Renew. IDAP A
11.05.01.12.03. In effect, the Agency treats the lessor as a complete stranger to the license.
In this matter, the District Court held that because BV Beverage did not "pick up the
phone" to inquire as to the renewal status of its license, then BV Beverage's due process rights
could not have been violated. R. p. 343. This holding misses the critical constitutional inquiry
to be made: i.e .. whether adequate due process procedures were in place; not whether the pa11y
deprived of constitutional protections made enough of an effol1 to work around inadequate
procedures.
Each of our due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or
implicitly, that because '"minimum [procedural] requirements (are]
a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the
State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem
adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official
actions." (citations omitted). Indeed, anv other conclusion
would allow the State to destrov at wilJ virtuallv anv statecreated property interest. The Coul1 has considered and rejected
such an approach: ''While the legislature may elect not to confer a
property interest, . . . it may not constitutionally authorize the
deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate
procedural safeguards....
[TJhe adequacy of statutory
procedures for deprivation of a statutorilv created property
interest must be analvzed in constitutional terms."

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (emphasis added).
Idaho's own due process jurisprudence recognizes the need for the same type of
procedural safeguards:

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 20

Due process of law is not necessarily satisfied by any process
which the legislature may by lmv provide. but by such process only
as safeguards and protects the fundamentaL constitutional rights of
the citizen. Where the state confers a license upon an individual to
practice a profession, trade or occupation, such license becomes a
valuable personal right which cannot be denied or abridged in any
manner except after due notice and a fair and impartial hearing
befrwe an unbiased tribunal.
Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 546, 207 P. 724, 727 (l 922).

The Supreme Court of the United States explained in Logan that where the established
state system itself deprives the claimant

his constitutional rights by operation of law, such

system is unconstitutional. Logan, 455 U.S. at 432. In Logan, a state agency's failure to take
action within the statutory timeframes caused a claimant to be deprived of his constitutional
rights. See, generally, Id. There, an employee had the right to file claim respecting employment
discrimination, but under established state procedure, a pre-requisite to filing a claim was for the
fair employment practices commission to initiate an investigation within 120 days of the
incident. Id.. at 424. The commission failed to timely commence the investigation and then
refused to allow the employee to file a claim. Id., at 426. The trial court held that the
commission's failure to timely institute the investigation deprived the claimant of the right to
bring his claim as a matter of law. Id., at 436. The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed
and found that "it rwas] the state system itself that destroys a complainant's property interest, by
operation of law" and held the system to be unconstitutional. Id.. at 436-38.

Tellingly, the

Supreme Court of the United States did not require the claimant in Logan to have ·'picked up the
phone .. to inquire as to the status of the investigation. Rather. the Court expressly noted that the
system was inadequate and held that
agency inaction. was unconstitutional.
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taking. Yvhich occurred by operation of law following

The instant case is similar to Logan because both established state systems work to
deprive an individual of property rights by operation of law as the result of agency inaction.
Under the Act. all state liquor licenses shall expire by operation of law at 1:00 o'clock a.m. on
the first day of the renewal month. I.C. § 23-908( l ). However, in order to renew a license, the
renewal applicant must first receive a renewal application from the Agency. The Agency does
not provide renewal application to lessors of liquor licenses. Accordingly, if the lessee fails to
timely renew. the Agency then deems the lessor's interest expired by operation of law and
without giving the lessor the opportunity to protect its rights.
The established state system created by the Agency creates an unconstitutional taking.
As a matter of constitutional law. because the State has created a marketplace for the lease of
liquor licenses. liquor license lessors have an interest in their respective liquor licenses that are
subject to minimum due process protections. The Agency cannot, therefore. require lessors to
rely exclusively on their lessees to timely renevv. Likewise. the Agency cannot treat lessors as
complete strangers to the license and require the lessor to complete a transfer from the lessee
back to the lessor as a precondition to allowing the lessor the right to renew. Without proper
notice and opportunity to renew given to the lessor in its capacity as lessor, adverse actions taken
against the lessee (even if they occur by operation of law) cannot impact the lessor's property
rights. The lessor must be afforded the opportunity to protect its own interest. The District
Court erred by placing upon BV Beverage the duty to "pick up the phone" to work around the
constitutionally inadequate system as a precondition to asserting the violation of its due process
rights.
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2.

BV Beverage Does Not Claim that § 23-908 is unconstitutional; only that the
ABC has given § 23-908 an unconstitutional interpretation and application.

Contrary to the ABC's contention. BV Beverage does not claim, and has not claimed at
any point during this matter. that Idaho Code § 23-908 is unconstitutional. Rather, BV Beverage
submitted below that Idaho Code § 23-908, by creating a marketplace for the transfer of a liquor
license by lease, created a valuable. protectable property right in the owner/lessor's interest in a
liquor license. R. p. 169-180. Through its interpretation of Idaho Code Section 23-908 and its
refusal to allow owner/lessors the right to renew. the ABC is abridging an owner's valuable
property rights without due process of law. The District Court agreed with this argument and
held that such property right does exist and, further. that there were substantial problems with the
ABC's renewal procedures. R. p. 342-43.
The ABC correctly notes that where a property right exists, the constitutional
jurisprudence of both the United States of America and the State of Idaho provides
there must be some process to ensure that the individual is not
arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal
constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant is
provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Resp. Br. at 11 (citing A herdeen-Springfield Canal Co .. 133 Idaho at 91, 982 P.2d at 926, citing
State v. Rhoades. 121 Idaho 63, 72. 822 P.2d 960. 969 (1991); and A.E. "Ed" Fridenstine v.
Idaho Dep"t ofAdministrafion. 133 Idaho 188, 983 P.2d 842 (1999)). The Agency maintains,

however. that it is not required to allow lessors the opportunity to renew liquor licenses because,
under the fdaho Supreme Court's holding in Uptick, the right to renew a liquor license is a
privilege which may only be exercised by the named licensee. Uptick Cmp. v. Ahlin, 103 Idaho
364, 64 7 P .2d 1236 ( 1982 ). However, as discussed at length above, Up! ick is not controlling and
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the Agency is under a constitutional duty to create due process procedures that adequately
protect the property interests of owner/lessors.

3.

Providing owner/lessors with notice and an opportunity to renew is not
inconsistent with Idaho Code § 23-908.

The ABC argues that Section 23-908 does not authorize it to allow the owner/lessor of a
liquor license to renew such license. Resp. Br. at 16-19. However, the actual words of this
statute do not mandate this conclusion.

Moreover, adopting the ABC's interpretation would

deprive BV Beverage of its interest in the license without due process protections. thereby giving
rise to an unconstitutional interpretation of the statute.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that where a statute is plain, clear and
unambiguous, this Court is constrained to follow that plain meaning and neither add to the statute
nor take away by judicial construction. Moon v. S'tate Board of Land Commissioners, 111 Idaho
389, 392, 724 P.2d 125. 128 (1986).

Section 28-903(1) is not ambiguous.

If a statute is

ambiguous and the court is faced with two constructions of a statute, one of which would render
it unconstitutional and one of which would not, this Court must adopt the construction that would
uphold the statute. Aloon, 111 Idaho at 392, 724 P.2d at 128. Because the actual words of
Section 23-908 do not restrict the ABC from providing owner/lessors with the opportunity to
renew a license and because that interpretation is constitutional it must be adopted.
In order to find a statutory prohibition against owner/lessors exercising the right to renew
a license. this Court must read the words "only the licensee" into two sentences within the
statute.

However, where the legislature intended to refer to "only the licensee" it did so

expressly. Conversely, where the passive voice is used no subject is specified.
The statute provides three material portions directly addressing renewals: two are

111

passive voice and one is in active voice. (Passive) ··Al! licenses shall expire at 1:00 o'clock a.m.
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on the first day of the renewal month which shall be determined by the director by administrative
rule and shall be subject to annual renewal upon proper application." I.C. § 23-908(1) (emphasis
added). (Passive) "[r]enewal applications for liquor by the drink licensee accompanied by the
required fee must he filed with the director on or before the first day of the designated renewal
month." I.C. § 23-908(1) (emphasis added). The passive voice used in these two sentences
indicates that there are no restrictions regarding the proper actor.
However. when discussing the consequences of not timely filing a renewal application,
the legislature specifically invokes an active voice, noting that consequences run to only the
licensee-the only party exercising the privilege of engaging in the retail sale of alcohol:

Any licensee holding a valid license who fails to file an application
for renewal of his current license on or before the first day of the
designated renewal month shall have a grace period of an
additional thirty-one (31) days in which to file an application for
renewal of the license. The licensee shall not be permitted to sell
and dispense liquor by the drink at retail during the thirty-one (31)
day extended time period unless and until the license is renewed.
Idaho Code § 23-908( 1) (emphasis added). The legislature specifically stated that if a licensee
(i.e .. the only party holding an interest in the liquor license who is authorized to engage in retail
sale of liquor by the drink) fails to timely renew, the licensee can no longer engage in retail sale
of liquor by the drink. In contrast to the passive sentences that do not identifying a particular
subject (thereby indicating any person may file a renewal application and fee), this is the only
sentence that directly addresses the licensee and specifically restricts privileges associated with
use of a license. These portions of Section 28-903( l) show that the legislature knew how to (and
did) indicate when the statute was to apply to only a licensee.

Accordingly, the restrictive

renewal procedures put in place by the ABC are not mandated by the statute.
The ABC's interpretation also requires this Court to read into the statute a historical
judicial gloss. ABC argues that the language of Idaho Code § 23-908, which provides ... "no
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person except the licensee therein named except as herein otherwise provide, shall exercise any
of the privileges granted thereunder .. .'' (Resp. Br. at 16) -combined with dicta from Uptick v.

Ahlin that provides that the privilege to renew a liquor license was exclusive to the named
licensee (Resp. Br. at 18-19). means that the privilege of the right to renew is exclusive to the
named licensee. However, the statute never expressly identified the right to renew as a privilege
and, explained above, the rationale behind Uptick no longer controls and the statute does not
mandate the reading suggested by Uptick.

Accordingly, Uptick need not preclude this Court

from giving the statute the constitutional interpretation offered by BV Beverage.
By removing this historical judicial gloss of Uptick and focusing, instead, on the actual
words of the statute. this Court can give that statute a reading that protects the property rights of
an owner lessor and gives the statute a constitutional interpretation.

Accordingly, the

interpretation offered by the ABC must be rejected.
4.

The Agency's failure to enact constitutionally adequate procedures is a
reviewable agency action.

In this matter, the District Court improperly held that because the license expired by
operation of law. the Agency took no reviewable action. R. p. 341. However, the appealable
error raised by B V Beverage is that the agency failed to enact constitutionally adequate
procedures which BV Beverage could have used to prevent its owner/lessor·s interest in the
license from expiring by operation of law. App. Br. at 15-16. The ABC has not addressed this
point of error. instead reiterating the District Court's holding. Resp. Br. at 23.
The record in this matter presents undisputed evidence that the ABC failed to put
procedures in place whereby BV Beverage. as the owner/lessor of a liquor license, could have
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renewed its interest in the license in its own right (i.e., without first processing a transfer of the
3
. R. p. 1'7-1?8
. If) . R. p. 16,.,J ( ,.,·
license from Iggy" s bac k· to itse
dtmg
.... ~ ). Under Idaho law,

administrative action may be revievved where such action was ..(a) in violation of constitutional
or statutory provisions'' or .. (c) made upon unlawful procedure.''

In this case, the alleged

deprivation occurred as the result Agency's failure to enact constitutionally adequate procedures.
The fact that the Agency's failures precluded BV Beverage from being able to protect its interest
in the license from expiring by operation of law cannot preclude BV Beverage from redress for
the harm caused by the agency inaction. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co .. 455 U.S. 422, 432
( 1982). BV Beverage respectfully requests that this Court hold that unconstitutional inaction is.
indeed, reviewable and on such grounds reverse that portion of the District Court's decision
holding that the Agency did not take any action that is reviewable.

HI.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, BV Beverage respectfully submits that the ABC has not
presented any compelling argument or authority supporting the absence of lawful renewal
procedures necessary to allow an owner/lessor of a liquor license to protect its valuable property
rights in the same. Because no such procedure exists, the expiration by operation of law of BV
Beverage's interest it its license without notice and opportunity to renew the same is
unconstitutional and cannot be upheld. BV Beverage requests that the District Court's holding
that this is not a reviewable agency action and the District Courf s holding that BV Beverage's

1

In a letter rejecting BV Beverage's position that it should have had notice and opponunity to renew the license.
without first having to transfer it back to itself from
the ABC informed BV Beverage as follows: ··ABC is
not statutorily. nor required by regulation to give a notice of renewal to a licnesee. much less an entity that is not the
named licensee.·· And. further. that "'It appears that BV Beverage failed. due to its own oversight. to exercise its
option to repossess and transfer the Iicense back to itself.... Had BV Beverage taken this step, BV Beverage would
have known, long before Iggy's license expired. when the license was due to be renewed.'' R. p. 128.
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due process rights were not violated be overturned and this matter be remanded to the District
Court with instructions to enter a judgment reinstating the license to BV Beverage.
DATED this 23rd day of July. 2012.

RAINEY LAW OFFICE

Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of July. 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served by the method

indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Cheryl Meade
Idaho State Police/Alcohol Beverage Control
700 S. Stratford
Meridian, Idaho 83642

MJJ .S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

AltorneyfiJr Respondent

Rebecca A. Rainey
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CHAPTER 74
(H.B. No. 71)

AN ACT
RELATING TO ANNUAL FEES PAID TO THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION;
AMENDING SECTION 61-1001, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL COSTS OF THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,
OTHER THAN SALARIES AND RELATED PAYROLL EXPENSES OF COMMISSIONERS,
BE PAID FROM FEES ASSESSED AGAINST UTILITIES, RAILROAD CORPORATIONS AND MOTOR CARRIERS .
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 61-1001, Idaho Code, be, and the same is
hereby amended to read as follows:
61-1001. ANNUAL FEES PAYABLE TO COMMISSION BY PUBLIC UTILITIES
MOTOR CARRIERS -- PURPOSE. Each public utility and each railroad
corporation, subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, and
subject to the provisions of this act, shall pay to the commission in
each year, a special regulatory fee in such amount as the commission
shall find and determine to be necessary, together with the amount of
all other fees paid or payable to the commission by each such public
utility and railroad corporation in the current calendar year,
together with the fees collected by the commission from motor carriers
under chapter 8 , title 61, Idaho Code, to defray the amount to be
expended by the commission for expenses in supervising and regulating
the public utilities, railroad corporations and motor carriers subject
to its jurisdiction exeepe-£or-adminiseraeive--personnel--eoses--whieh
AND

shall-be-prov±ded-£rom-the-generai-£and~-For-ehis-pttrpose;-adminisera

eive- -personnei-eoses-shaii-mean-saiaries-and-relaeed-payroli-expenses
£or-ehe-eommissioners;-the-seereeary-o£-ehe-eommission-and-administraeor;-and-elerks-and-seeretaries-assigned-to-administration, except for

salaries and related payroll expenses for the commissioners.
Approved March 23, 1981 .

CHAPTER 75
(H.B. No. 98)

AN ACT
RELATING TO LIQUOR BY THE DRINK LICENSES; AMENDING SECTION 23-908,
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR A FEE FOR THE TRANSFER OF A LIQUOR BY
THE DRINK LICENSE.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 23-908, Idaho Code, be , and the
hereby amended to read as fol.lows:

same

is

c.
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23-908. FORM OF LICENSE
AUTHORITY -- EXPIRATION -- LIMITATIONS. (1) Every license issued under this act shall set forth the
me of the person to whom issued, the location by street and number,
other definite designation, of the premises, and such other
~rformation as the director shall deem necessary. If issued to a partinership, the names o f t he persons const1.tut1ng
·
·
·
sue.h partners h i.p
s ha 11
~e set forth. If issued to a corporation or association, the names of
the principal officers and the governing board shall be set forth .
Such license shall be signed by the licensee and prominently displayed
in the place of business at all times . Every license issued under the
provisions of this act is separate and distinct and no person except
the licensee therein named except as herein otherwise provided, shall
. exercise any of the privileges granted thereunder. All licenses shall
expire at 1:00 o'clock A. M. on January 1st of the following year and
shall be subject to renewal upon proper application. Renewal applications for liquor by the drink licenses accompanied by the required fee
must be filed with the director on or before January 1st of the
following year, provided, however, any licensee holding a valid license who fails to file an application for renewal of his current license on or before January 1st of the following year shall have a
·•grace period of an additional thirty-one (31) days in which to file an
application for renewal of his license and during which time he shall
: not be permitted to sell and dispense liquor by the drink at retail.
No person shall be granted more than one (1) license in any city for
.any one (1) year; and no partnership, associati on or corporation holding a license under this act shall have as a member, officer or stoc kholder any person who has any financial interest of any kind in, or is
a member of, another partnership or association or an officer of
another corporation holding a licens e in the same city for the same
rear; provided that this section shal l not prevent any person, firm or
corporation, owning two (2) or more buildings on connected property in
• city from making application for and r e ceiving licenses permitting
the sale of liquor by the drink in such building.
(2) An application to transfer any license issued pursuant to
chapter 9, title 23, Idaho Code, shall be made to the director. Upon
re ceipt of such an application, the di rector shall make the same
i nvestigation and determinations with respect to the transferee as are
required by section 23-907, Idaho Code, and if the director shall
!letermine that all of the conditions required of a licensee under
chapter 9, title 23, Idaho Code, have been met by the proposed transfe ree, then the license shall be indorsed over to the proposed transf~ree by said licensee for the remainder of the period for which such
icense has been issued and the di re ctor shall note his approval
thereof upon such license.
·
(3) Each new license issued on or after July 1, 1980, shall be
laced into actual use by the original licensee at the time of issu;nce and remain in use for at least six (6) consecutive months or be
Orfeited to the state and be eligible for issue to another person by
~ director after compliance with the provisions of section 23-907,
tw ho Code. Such license shall not be transferrable for a period of
'frro (2) years from the date of original issuance, except as provided
subsections i!!l(a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of-stteseetioa-(47 of this
na
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section .
(4) The fee for transferring a liquor license shall be ten per
cent (10%) of the purchase price of the liquor license or the cost of
good will , whichever i s greater; except no fee shall be collected in
the following events:
(a) The transfer of a license between husband and wife in the
event of a property division; or
(b) The transfer of a license to a receiver, trus t ee in bankruptcy or similar person or officer; or
( c) The transfer of a license to the heirs or personal representative of the estate in the event of the death of the licensee;
or
(d) The transfer of a license arising out of the di ssolution of a
partnership where the license is transferred to one or more of the
partners.,.~

(e) The trans fer of a license within a fam ily whethe r an individual, partnership or corporation .
(5) The fee for transferring a liquor license for other than a
sale shall be fifty per cent (50%) of the per annum license fee set
forth in section 23-904, Idaho Code; except no fee shal l be collected
for transfers as outl ined in section 23- 908, subsection (4)(a), (b),
(c), (d), or (e), Idaho Code .
( 6) The controlling interest i n the stock ownership of a corporate ""licensee sha ll not be, directly or indirectly , sold , t ransferred ,
or hypothecated unless the licensee be a corporation, the stock of
which is listed on a stock exchange in Idaho , or in the city of New
York, state of New Yo rk, or which is required by l aw t o file periodi c
reports with the securities and exchange commission. Provided , however, that in the event of the t r ansfer of more than twenty-five per
cent (25%) of t he authori zed and issued stock of the corporation, it
shall create a rebuttable presumption that such transfer constitutes a
transfer of the contro l ling interest of such corporation.
Approved March 23, 1981 .

CHAPTER 76
(H .B. No. 99 )

AN ACT
RELATING TO THE SALE OF KEG BEER; AMENDING CHAPTER 10, TITLE 23, IDAHO
CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 23- 1018, IDAHO CODE, TO
REQUIRE THAT THE SELLER OF KEG BEER BE I DENTIFIED ON THE CONTAINER .
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Chapter 10, Title 23, Idaho Code, be, and the
same is hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be
known and designated as Section 23- 1018, Idaho Code, and to read a s
follows:
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Minutes of the State Affairs Committee
Held January 27, 1981
Page 2
RS 6307

TRANSPORTING ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN OPEN CONTAINER. Mr. Cade
explained that this bill changes wording. As it now stands,
the officer must see a person break the seal of container to
find him guilty. This changes the wordage in 1947 bill to
close this loophole. This does not apply to beer.

MOTION:

Representative Paxman made a motion that RS 6307 be introduced,
the motion was seconded by Rep. Braun. The motion carried.

RS 6309:, PROHIBITS SALE OR DISPENSING OF WINE AT ANY UNLICENSED
PREMISES. Mr. Cade explained that this relates to allowing
consumption of liquor on premisis to require liquor license.
Mr. Cade asked permission to speak to RS 6309 and RS 6310
at same time as they are companion bills. Permission was
granted. This bill would require that any place other than
a private residence would be included in this law. This would
require purchase also of city and county licenses in addition
to state license.
MOTION:

Representative Bunting made a motion to return RS 6309 to the
sponsor. The motion was seconded by Rep. Lewis. The motion
carried.

RS 6310:

PROHIBITS SALE OR DISPENSING OF BEER AT ANY UNLICENSED PREMISES.
Companion bill to RS 6309.

MOTION:

A motion was made by Rep. Bunting and seconded by Rep. Lewis
to return this bill to the sponsor. The motion carried.

RS 6291

RELATES TO THE TRANSFER AND USE OF RETAIL LIQUOR LICENSES ONCE
OBTAINED FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO. Mr. Cade pointed out that
last year the legislature passed a transfer fee on the sale of
liquor license at 10% of price. This legislation would require
that a transfer other than sale shall be subject to a transfer.
fee of 50% of the annual license fee. Mr. Cade explained the
license fee rates according to population and the total costs
involved.

MOTION:

A motion was made by Representative Hammond and seconded by
Rep. Paxman to introduce RS 6291. The motion carried.

RS 6375:

REPEALS IDAHO PLANNING AND ZONING ACT. Representative Fullmer
spoke in favor of this bill. He stated that the State Code
takes right from property owner to use his land as he sees fit.
He feels there are too many controls over private property
owners. Mr. Fullmer cited instances of problems he had dealt
with in LosAngeles relating to zoning ordinances. He expressed
fear of Idaho experiencing many of these problems. Mr$. Oliason
also spoke to RS 6375. She mentioned several abuses she felt
had taken place in Ada county.

MOTION:

A motion to introduce was made by Representative Montgomery;
the motion was seconded by Rep. Little. Rep. Montgomery stated
that he thinks RS 6375 will generate discussion on matters of
great concern to many constitutients. Several other representatives
expressed this same feeling. Rep. Higgins stated that he would
oppo~e repeal but does not oppose change.
Motion carried.
There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned
at 11:25 a.m.

House State Affairs Committee
February 17, 1981
Page 2
MOTION:

Rep. Little made a motion with Rep. Harris seconding to
send HB 97 to the floor with a "do oass" recommendation.
An amended motion was made by Rep. Chatburn and seconded
by Rep. Little to draft a new bill. The Amended Motion
Carried. A new bill will be drafted.

HB 98:

WOULD PROVIDE FOR A FEE FOR THE TRANSFER OF A LIQUOR BY
THE DRINK LICENSE. Mr. Cade explained that liquor last year
the legislature passed a transfer fee on the sale of liquor
licenses at 10% of the license fee imposed by the state.
HB 98 would require that a transfer other than sale shall
be subject to a transfer fee of 50% of the annual license
fee. Mr. Cade explained the license fee rates increase
according to population.

MOTION:

Rep. McDermott made a motion to hold HB 98 for further study
no second was made. Rep. Little made a motion to send
HB 98 to the floor with a "do oass" recommendation.
Rep. Chatburn seconded the motion. Rep. McDermott stated that
she does not feel that a case is made to change the law.
Rep. Lewis stated that he feels it will give the Dept. of
Law Enforcement more control and would be in favor of the bill.
The motion carried. Rep. Danielson will sponsor the bill.

HB 99:

IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM FOR KEG BEER. Mr. Cade stated that this
is a companion bill to HB 97. The keg beer will be identified
with a tag which will in turn identify the seller and buyer.
There would be no cost of tags to seller and the records would
be kept for one year.

MOTION:

Representative Bateman made a motion to send HB 99 to the
floor with a "do pass" recommendation. Rep. Harris seconded
the motion. Rep. Stoicheff indicated that keg licensing
should be sufficient to help with problems. Rep. McDermott
expressed concern of large amounts of paperwork for sellers
and feels distributors try to assure they're not selling to
minors. Rep. Bateman stated that HB 99 would be a good tool
to help with the problem. The Motion carried. Rep. Bateman
will sponsor the bill on the floor.

-=---'

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned.

Affairs Minutes

- 2 -

March 10, 1981

agreements because Indian tribes are not included
in the statute as a government or state agency.

N:

Senator Twilegar moved and Senator Kiebert seconded
this be sent out with a "do pass" recommendation.
Motion carried.

N:

Senator Risch moved and Senator Twilegar seconded
the reappointment of Eugene Miller to the State Board
of Education, be sent out 'llith a "do confirm" recommendation. Motion carried.
ANNUAL FEES PAID TO THE PUBLIC UTILITIES

COMMISSIO~.

Jim Fell, PUC, explained the legislation which would
allow administrative personnel costs other than the
salaries of the commissioners to be paid from fees
assessed against utilities, railroad corporations
and motor carriers.

JN:

Senator Twileger moved and Senator Steen seconded
this be sent out vJith a "do pass" recommendation.
Motion carried.

3

LIQUOR BY THE DRINK LICENSES.
Pat Riceci explained the legislition. He said since
the passage of this legislation a problem has come
up regarding the leasing of the license. A license
is leased out and thus gets around the transfer fee.

ON:

13

Senator Twilegar moved and Senator Risch seconded
this be sent out \'lith a "do pass" recommendation.
Motion carried.

EXPENDITURES FOR COMMUNICATIONS & POSTAGE FOR STATE

AGENCIES.
Mr.
the
30%
the

Luthy, Department of Administration, explained
legislation. He said they were experiencing a
increase in costs. This bill would give them
authority to pay their bills on time.

:ON:

Senator Risch moved and Senator Twilegar seconded
this bill go out with a "do pass" recommendation.
Motion carried.

7173

DISQUALIFICATIONS FROM JURY DUTY: OVER 70.

ION:

Senator Steen moved and Senator Twilegar seconded this
be sent for introduction. Motion carried.

